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Abstract
The South Korean citizenship status of North Korean escapees has long been a 
source of confusion outside of Korea and contestation within Korea. The first 
element of confusion relates to whether all North Korean escapees are formally 
South Korean citizens. The second element of confusion relates to whether the 
formal South Korean citizenship will necessarily be recognized by the South 
Korean government. This article will examine both of these questions. It will 
argue that according to current Korean laws and jurisprudence most North Korean 
escapees are indeed South Korean citizens. This article will show that there are in 
fact only three rare categories of North Korean citizen who are not South Korean 
citizens: naturalized North Korean nationals of a non-Korean ethnicity; North 
Korean nationals who have voluntarily taken on the citizenship of a third country, 
and North Korean nationals who can trace their Korean lineage only through 
maternal descent prior to June 14, 1998. The article will then examine the 
practical availability of citizenship rights for North Koreans, and will demonstrate 
that in some circumstances, South Korean citizenship is rendered ineffective 
by the lack of a legal entitlement to an entrance permit or documentation of 
citizenship that would allow the individual to access transportation to South 
Korea. This article will conclude by recommending that the Act on Protection and 
Settlement Support should be revised to explicitly clarify that all North Koreans 
who are South Korean citizens are entitled to receive permission to enter South 
Korea, from where they can then obtain documentary proof of their South Korean 
citizenship.
KeyWords: Nationality, North Korea, Resettlement, Protection, Citizenship, 
Refugees
Manuscript received on January 13, 2014; review completed on July 2, 2014; accepted on 
July 18, 2014.
Ⅰ.  Introduction.
In recent years, the question of whether North Koreans necessarily have 
South Korean citizenship, which was previously of paltry (and largely academic) 
interest outside of the Korean peninsula, has gained far greater practical 
significance.1 The reason for this development lies in the treatment of North 
Korean asylum seekers under the Refugee Convention of 1951 (‘Refugee 
Convention’).2 Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention states that an asylum 
seeker who is a dual national must fear persecution in both of his or her countries 
of nationality in order to be considered a refugee.3 In short, therefore, if a North 
Korean escapee is deemed by a destination country to also be a South Korean 
national, then he or she must show a fear of persecution in both North and South 
Korea in order to receive refugee status. Arguably, if a North Korean escapee has 
South Korean citizenship but lacks a legal entitlement to enter South Korea, then 
he or she should not be considered to be a dual national.
Courts around the world have struggled to answer these related questions, and 
have answered the questions in different ways. Australian cases have consistently 
found North Korean escapees to be automatically South Korean citizens.4 In 
Canada, the courts have been divided. In Kim v. Canada, the court found that 
North Korean escapees did not automatically have South Korean citizenship, but 
would rather have to apply for such citizenship, with a significant risk of refusal.5 
However, more recently a Canadian tribunal found that a child born to a North 
Korean citizen is at birth considered a national of South Korea.6 In K.K. and Ors, 
the U.K. Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) found that North 
Koreans are South Korean citizens, but will be deemed to have forfeited their 
1.  For the sake of brevity, the terms ‘North Korea’ and ‘South Korea’ will be used 
in place of ‘Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ and ‘Republic of Korea’, 
respectively.
2. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
3. Id. art. 1(A)(2).
4.  See, e.g., Refugee Review Tribunal Case No.0909449 [2010] RRTA 763 (Austl.); 
Refugee Review Tribunal Case No.1000331 [2010] RRTA 932 (Austl.).
5. Kim v. Canada, [2010] F.C.R. 720  (Can.).
6. X (Re), 2013 CanLII 76469 (IRB), para. 64 (Can.).
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South Korean citizenship if they remain in a third country for over ten years.7 A 
French tribunal found a North Korean to be a South Korean citizen, but unable to 
have that citizenship recognized by the South Korean government (and therefore 
deserving of refugee status).8
This article will attempt to bring some order to this web of conflicting 
conclusions by outlining a clear and comprehensive answer to the question of 
whether North Koreans necessarily have South Korean citizenship, and whether 
North Korean escapees in practice have the ability to assert their South Korean 
citizenship by, for example, applying for permits allowing legal entry into South 
Korea. In short, this article will conclude that North Koreans are – with three 
categories of rare exceptions – South Korean citizens. They are not, however, all 
entitled to receive entry permits into South Korea when they apply for entry at 
overseas embassies or consulates, even though in practice the vast majority are 
permitted to resettle in South Korea.
Ⅱ. South Korean Citizenship Status
 
With some exceptions, it is settled law that North Korean nationals are, from 
birth, automatically South Korean citizens. This principle was accepted by the 
South Korean Supreme Court in the 1996 Yi Yongsun case.9 The South Korean 
Supreme Court’s ruling on this point was later affirmed by the South Korean 
7.  KK and ors (Nationality: North Korea) Korea v. Sec’y of State of Home Dep’t, [2011] 
UKUT 92 (IAC) (U.K.).
8.  Cour Nationale du Droit d’Asile [CNDA] [national court of asylum], September 2, 
2010, Mme L., n°08018788,C (Fr.).. 
9.  Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 96Nu1221, Nov. 11, 1996 (S. Kor.). Yi was a North 
Korean national who had lived legally in China for thirty years before coming to 
South Korea by purchasing a fraudulent Chinese passport. After notifying the South 
Korean police that she intended to defect, she was transferred to an immigration de-
tention center for deportation to China. She filed suit, claiming to be a South Korean 
national entitled to stay in South Korea. The South Korea Supreme Court ruled in 
her favor, concluding that she was automatically a South Korean national because of 
her North Korean heritage, and should therefore not be deported.
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Constitutional Court in the Nationality Act Case.10 The conclusion that North 
Korean nationals are automatically South Korean citizens has also been accepted 
by South Korean government officials11 and acknowledged by many influential 
Korean legal scholars.12 In brief, the reasoning for the South Korean citizenship 
of North Koreans is as follows.
According to Article 2(1) of the South Korean Constitution, “nationality in 
the Republic of Korea shall be prescribed by Act.”13 Since December 1948, the 
Nationality Act has regulated the possession of nationality.14 The Nationality Act 
10. Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 97Heonga12, Aug. 31, 2000 (S. Kor.).
11.  According to a submission by the Minister of Diplomacy and Trade in the National-
ity Act Case “Our country does not recognize the nationality of North Korea. There-
fore, a resident of North Korea can be considered as having our nationality” Id.; See 
also Jae-Chul Sim, On Legal Status of North Korean Defectors Residing in Third 
Countries, 49 Life & Hum. Rts. N. KoR. 7, 16 (2008) (“In principle, North Korean 
defectors out of North Korean territories shall be regarded as ROK nationals.”). At 
the time, Jae-Chul Sim was a Public Prosecutor in the Unification Legal Affairs Di-
vision of the Ministry of Justice, although he specified that his article should not be 
considered the official South Korean position. 
12.  See, e.g., Eric Yong-Joong Lee, Human Rights Protections of North Koreans in a 
Third Country: A Legal Approach, 4 J. KoReaN L. 155, 169 (2004) (“South Korea 
regards [North Korean escapees] directly as its own nationals”); In Seop Chung et 
al., The Treatment of Stateless Persons and Reduction of Statelessness: Policy Sug-
gestions for the Republic of Korea, 13 KoRea Rev. iNt’L. stud. 7, 22 (2010) (“the 
dominant scholarly opinion regard North Korean territory as a part of the territory 
of the Republic of Korea, and therefore all North Korean people as nationals of the 
Republic of Korea”); Young-kwan Choi, Situation and Status of the Externally Dis-
placed North Koreans and the Issue of Protecting Human Rights, in NatioNaL Hu-
maN RigHts CommissioN of KoRea 151, 155 (2005) (“The South Korean constitution 
defines the externally displaced North Koreans living overseas as Korean citizens”); 
Jung-Sun Park & Paul Chang, Contention in the Construction of a Global Commu-
nity: The Case of the Overseas Korean Act, 10 J. KoReaN stud. 1, 4 (2005) (“With 
respect to citizenship, North and South Koreans are, in theory, simultaneously citi-
zens of both North and South Korea because both states claim governmental power 
over the entire Korean peninsula.”).
13.  1948 daeHaN miNKuK HuNbeob [HuNbeob] [CoNstitutioN] art. 2(1) (July 17, 1948) (S. 
Kor.).
14.  Gukjeokbeob [South Korea Nationality Act], Act. No. 16, Dec. 20, 1948, amended by 
Act. No. 10275, May 4, 2010.
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has been revised on a number of occasions, but has never directly addressed the 
issue of North Korean nationals.15 The Nationality Act currently provides for 
South Korean nationality “at birth” for: 
1.  A person whose father or mother is a national of the Republic 
of Korea at the time of a person’s birth;
 2.  A person whose father was a national of the Republic of Korea 
at the time of the father’s death, if the person’s father died 
before the person’s birth;
3.  A person who was born in the Republic of Korea, if both of the 
person’s parents are unknown or have no nationality.16
While the very limited jus soli provision in Article 2(3) is rarely invoked, 
this clause would by its terms grant South Korean nationality to those born of 
unknown or stateless parents in North Korea because Article 3 of the South 
Korean Constitution states that the “territory of the Republic of Korea shall 
consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands.”17 Article 3 of the South 
Korean Constitution is interpreted to cover the area controlled by both North 
Korea and South Korea.18
The more common way to acquire South Korean nationality is through descent. 
Prior to the founding of South Korea in 1948, Koreans possessed – according to 
the South Korean Supreme Court – Chosun nationality.19 While there is a lack of 
clarity as to the exact legal nature of Chosun nationality, it has been interpreted 
as equivalent to subjecthood under the Taehanjeguk (Empire of Korea) that 
15.  During the 1998 revisions to the Nationality Act, the Ministry of Justice reportedly 
stated that a provision on North Koreans’ nationality was deliberately excluded be-
cause North Koreans are already South Korean citizens under South Korean law. 
See Jae-Chun Won, North Korean Human Rights and the Failure of Protection: The 
Plight of North Koreans in Flight, in NoRtHeast asiaN PeRsPeCtives oN iNteRNa-
tioNaL Law 141, 154 (Seokwoo Lee & Hee Eun Lee eds., 2013). (citing Dong-Hyun 
Seok, Revision of Korean Nationality Law: The Direction of Revising the Korean 
Nationality Law, 4 seouL iNt’L L. Res. 25 (1997)).
16.  South Korea Nationality Act, supra note 14, art. 2. Prior to June 14, 1998, the Na-
tionality Act only provided for South Korean nationality through paternal descent. 
17.  1948 daeHaN miNKuK HuNbeob [HuNbeob] [CoNstitutioN] art. 3 (July 17, 1948) (S. 
Kor.).
18. South Korea Supreme Court, Sep. 28, 1961, 4249 Haeng Sang 48.
19. Yi Yongsun Case, supra note 9.
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ruled Korea immediately prior to Japanese annexation.20 Two important points 
regarding Chosun nationality are quite clear, however. First, Chosun nationality 
was possessed equally by residents of the entire Korean peninsula, including the 
area currently governed by both North Korea and South Korea. Second, Chosun 
nationality was, at least at the time of South Korea’s founding, acquired through 
paternal descent. Prior to the establishment of South Korea in the U.S.-occupied 
Southern part of the Korean peninsula, the U.S. Army Military Government 
enacted the Provisional Ordinance on Nationality, which stated in Article 2(1) 
that a person born to a Korean father shall acquire the nationality of Chosun.21 
Thus, at the time of the establishment of South Korea, individuals of paternal 
Korean descent throughout the peninsula were Chosun nationals. Then, upon 
the founding of South Korea, Chosun nationality was converted into South 
Korean nationality through the action of then-Article 100 of South Korea’s 
founding Constitution, which clarified that then-current law and ordinances in 
force remained effective unless they violated the Constitution.22 This meant that 
all individuals of Korean paternal descent (anywhere on the Korean peninsula) 
who were born before 1948 automatically gained South Korean nationality at the 
establishment of the South Korean state. Between 1948 and 1998, the paternal 
descendants of these individuals also automatically became South Korean 
nationals, whether they were born on the north or south side of the Korean 
peninsula, due to the jus sanguinis provisions in Article 2(1) or Article 2(2) of 
the South Korean Nationality Act. In 1998, revisions to the Nationality Act made 
South Korean citizenship automatic at birth when either the father or mother is a 
Korean national.  
The remaining element of the analysis then involves the question of whether 
the acquisition of North Korean nationality results in the loss of South Korean 
nationality, given that until 2011 South Korea in all cases prohibited the 
possession of dual nationality (as it still does in many circumstances).23 The South 
Korean Supreme Court answered in the 1996 Yi Yongsun case that the prohibition 
20.  See Chulwoo Lee, South Korea: The Transformation of Citizenship and the State-
Nation Nexus, 40 J. CoNtemP. asia 230, 234 (2010). Prior to the establishment of the 
Empire of Korea, the term Chosun was used to designate Korea from 1392 to 1897.
21.  [South Korean Provisional Government Act], Act. No. 11, May 11, 1948 (S. Kor.).
22.  1948 daeHaN miNKuK HuNbeob [HuNbeob] [CoNstitutioN] art. 100 (July 17, 1948) (S. 
Kor.). (currently, art. 5 of the Addenda to the Constitution).
23.  See Nora Hui-Jung Kim, Flexible Yet Inflexible: Development of Dual Citizenship in 
South Korea, 18 J. Korean Stud. 7 (2013).
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on dual nationality has no effect on a North Korean national’s possession of 
South Korean nationality.24 This is because North Korea is not recognized as a 
sovereign entity by the laws and constitution of South Korea, and thus North 
Korean citizenship has no legal significance.25 This non-recognition is mutual; 
according to the 1991 Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and 
Exchanges and Cooperation, inter-Korean relations are clarified as “not being 
a relationship as between states.”26 The South Korean Constitutional Court has 
affirmed this holding.27
A few caveats should be added to the above conclusion. First, it is worth 
noting that a small minority of Korean scholars, generally of a left-wing political 
orientation, would disagree with the South Korean Supreme Court’s and South 
Korean Constitutional Court’s conclusions, and argue that a proper reading of the 
South Korean Constitution and statutory framework leads to the conclusion that 
North Korean nationals are in fact not nationals of South Korea. These scholars 
claim that North Korea should properly be seen as a separate state, with its 
nationality respected as an alternative to South Korean nationality. As Jang-Hie 
Lee writes: 
In interpreting the constitution geared towards a peaceful 
unification of the Korean peninsula, the constitution views the 
current relationship as a peaceful coexistence and recognizes North 
Korea as a de-facto state and recognizes the current administration. 
As a result, the citizens of North Korea cannot be recognized as 
citizens of South Korea…28 
24. Yi Yongsun Case, supra note 9.
25.  According to an earlier decisions of the South Korea Supreme Court, “[t]he North 
region is a part of the Korean Peninsula which belongs to the Republic of Korea [as 
affirmed in Article 3 of the Constitution], so only the sovereignty of the Republic of 
Korea is valid in that region, and any other politics of sovereignty against the sover-
eignty of the Republic of Korea cannot be admitted in legal theory.” Supreme Court 
[S. Ct.], 4249 Haeng Sang 48, Sept. 28, 1961 (S. Kor.).
26.  Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation be-
tween South and North, N. Kor.-S. Kor., Dec. 13, 1991.
27. Nationality Act Case, supra note 10.
28.  Jang-Hie Lee, Understanding North Korean Human Rights Issues in the Aspect of 
International Law, and a Strategic Approach, in national Human rigHtS CommiS-
Sion of Korea 69, 76 (2005).   
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This perspective, however, is not accepted by South Korean courts, the South 
Korean government, or mainstream legal scholars.
Second, it is true that on some occasions, South Korean authorities have 
made statements referring to North Korean escapees “acquiring” South Korean 
nationality or being “eligible for” South Korean nationality.29 These statements 
have led to some confusion.30 They may be based on a mistranslation of legal 
terminology or a conflation of the process of acquiring South Korean nationality 
and the process of acquiring documentation of South Korean nationality. More 
likely, however, they result from diplomatic attempts to avoid the awkward 
conclusion that by refusing to provide the documentation necessary for some 
North Korean nationals to legally enter South Korea, the South Korean 
government is violating its own Constitution, specifically the Article 2(2) 
duty “to protect citizens residing abroad as prescribed by law”31 as well as its 
commitments under international law, specifically art 12(4) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that “[n]o one shall be 
29.  See, e.g., Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, Korea: 1. Could DFAT please pro-
vide clarification and elaboration on DFAT Report No. 362. 2. Are there are laws 
other than the "Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping 
from North Korea" that relate to or have an impact in determining the legal right 
of a North Korean defector to enter and reside in South Korea? (Nov. 28, 2005), 
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b6fe26cd.html (citing a Ministry of 
Unification source’s statement that “there is an ‘assumption’ that North Koreans can 
acquire South Korean citizenship”); Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea/Republic of Korea: The situation of citi-
zens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) who approach 
embassies of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in Canada or in other countries 
to request citizenship; whether North Koreans are automatically accepted as South 
Korean citizens and, if not, how this is determined; citizenship procedures; method 
to establish North Korean identity; whether North Korean applicants are provided 
assistance to allow them to travel to South Korea (3 June 2008), available at http://
www.refworld.org/docid/48d2237ec.html (citing a South Korean embassy official as 
stating that North Korean nationals are not automatically South Korean citizens, but 
must first apply and undergo a “citizenship process”).
30.  They have also been cited in Canada to support the proposition that North Korean 
escapees are not automatically South Korean citizens. Kim v. Canada, supra note 5, 
paras. 15-19.
31.  1948 daeHan minKuK Hunbeob [Hunbeob] [ConStitution] art. 2(2) (July 17, 1948) (S. 
Kor.).
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arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.”32 
Third, it must be emphasized that South Korean citizenship is purely formal 
prior to a North Korean national’s arrival in South Korea. North Koreans are not 
able to get proof of South Korean citizenship prior to arriving in South Korea, 
and they are (with a few exceptions) not given travel papers allowing entry to 
South Korea while they are in China. While most North Koreans (who do not 
fall into the citizenship exceptions detailed below) are given entrance permits 
and flights to Seoul when they approach South Korean embassies and consulates 
outside of China, some are not; namely members of the Chogyo group, who have 
lived legally in China for over ten years, and, some evidence suggests, North 
Korean escapees who ask South Korean authorities for resettlement while in a 
developed country with a strong refugee protection system and do not qualify for 
protection and support under South Korean law.33 
Ⅲ. Exceptions to the Rule
There are three exceptions to the general rule that North Koreans possess 
South Korean citizenship: naturalized North Korean nationals of a non-Korean 
ethnicity, North Korean nationals who have voluntarily taken on the citizenship 
of a third country, and North Korean nationals who can trace their Korean lineage 
only through maternal descent prior to June 14, 1998. Each of these cases will be 
discussed in turn.
While the vast majority of North Korean residents are descended from ethnic 
Koreans with a long history of family registration in the Korean peninsula, 
there has been a small amount of immigration into North Korea both before 
and after its founding. These individuals can be divided into four groups: first, 
ethnic Koreans who returned to North Korea after its founding, mainly from 
Japan;34 second, ethnic Japanese nationals who accompanied their ethnic Korean 
32.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12(4), Dec. 16, 1966, 99 
U.N.T.S. 171.
33. See infra, section IV.
34.  Over 90,000 ethnic Koreans emigrated from Japan to North Korea in the period 
from 1959 to 1984. See Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The Forgotten Japanese in North Ko-
rea: Beyond the Politics of Abduction, aSia-PaCifiC J., vol. 43-2-09, Oct. 26, 2009. 
Similarly, some ethnic Koreans who settled on Russia’s Sakhalin Island when it was 
part of Japan also emigrated to North Korea during the Cold War era. See Andrei 
Lankov, Koreans in Sakhalin, Korea timeS (Jan. 19, 2012, 17:13 PM), https://www.
koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2014/07/165_103201.html.
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spouses when they returned to North Korea;35 third, Chinese immigrants or, more 
commonly, the descendants of Chinese immigrants, many of whose ancestors 
emigrated to Korea during the late nineteenth century;36 and fourth, an extremely 
small number of immigrants from elsewhere in the world (including some 
defectors and abductees). The first group – ethnic Koreans who migrated to 
North Korea from Japan (and their descendants) – would generally be considered 
South Korean nationals (and given protection by South Korea when they escape). 
These individual’s ancestors have roots in the Korean peninsula, and in principle, 
they would be in the same position as those ethnic Koreans still living in Japan, 
who are considered South Korean nationals so long as they have not accepted 
Japanese nationality. This brings up the one caveat: those ethnic Korean returnees 
who had naturalized to Japanese citizenship prior to going to North Korea (as 
some reportedly had37) would not be considered South Korean nationals, as they 
would have lost their South Korean nationality at the time of naturalization due 
to the South Korean prohibition on voluntarily attaining the nationality of another 
country.38
On the other hand, ethnic Japanese or Chinese immigrants and their 
descendants (or the very rare North Korean immigrants of other nationality) 
would not be South Korean nationals because they do not have ancestors from 
Korea. From the perspective of South Korean law, it would be irrelevant whether 
or not these individuals have naturalized to North Korean citizenship, as is 
permitted by North Korean nationality law.39 It is difficult to ascertain how many 
35.  An estimated 6,730 ethnic Japanese individuals, mainly spouses of returning Ko-
reans, migrated to North Korea between 1959 and 1984. Morris-Suzuki, supra note 
34.
36.  There are an estimated 5,000 Chinese immigrants remaining in North Korea, mostly 
living in Pyongyang and Sinuiju, although they often work in China. Liang Chen, 
Ethnic Chinese in North Korea Find Themselves Caught Between Two Worlds, glob-
al timeS (July 11, 2013, 19:48:01PM), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/795550.
shtml.
37. Morris-Suzuki, supra note 34.
38.  South Korea Nationality Act, supra note 14, art. 15(1) (“A national of a foreign coun-
try who has voluntarily attained the nationality of a foreign country shall lose the 
nationality of the Republic of Korea at the time of attainment of the foreign national-
ity.”)
39.  [North Korea Nationality Law], Act. No. 52, Oct. 9, 1963, art. 15, amended by Act. 
No. 483, Feb. 26, 1999 (S. Kor.) (“Applications regarding the acquisition or loss of 
the Republic’s citizenship shall be decided by the decision of the Presidium of the 
Supreme People’s Assembly.”).
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(if any) of the ethnic Japanese spouses and immigrants from other countries have 
naturalized to become North Korean citizens, which requires the approval of the 
Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly. Most of the Chinese immigrants 
and their descendants have not become North Korean nationals (unless they also 
have a North Korean national parent), and retain their Chinese nationality.
The second exception is North Korean nationals who have voluntarily 
taken up a second nationality prior to coming to South Korea. South Korean 
nationality is automatically forfeited upon voluntary acquisition of a foreign state 
nationality under Article 15(1) of the Nationality Act.40 No express consent of 
the South Korean government is required for this to occur. They would in most 
cases continue to be North Korean nationals, however, because North Korean 
nationality is apparently not automatically forfeited upon accepting another 
nationality, but rather would only be relinquished by making a petition to the 
North Korean People’s Assembly.41 North Korean nationals who have voluntarily 
taken up a second nationality may petition the South Korean Minister of Justice 
to have their nationality reinstated, however, pursuant to Article 9(1) of the South 
Korea Nationality Act.42 If successful, reinstatement of South Korean nationality 
must in most cases be followed by renunciation of the other nationality within a 
year.43 
It should be stressed that the above exception only applies to individuals who 
voluntarily take a second nationality. Those born with a second nationality would 
be considered dual nationals, although the South Korean Ministry of Justice could 
ask them to renounce their second nationality once they reach the age of 22.44 If 
40.  South Korea Nationality Act, supra note 14, art. 15(1) (“A national of a foreign coun-
try who has voluntarily attained the nationality of a foreign country shall lose the 
nationality of the Republic of Korea at the time of attainment of the foreign nation-
ality.”) This provision was not affected by the 2011 revisions that legitimized dual 
nationality in certain other circumstances.
41.  North Korea Nationality Law, supra note 39.
42.  South Korea Nationality Act, supra note 14, art. 9(1). Nationality will not be rein-
stated for a person who has inflicted harm on the State or society; whose conduct is 
disorderly; who renounced South Korean nationality in order to avoid South Korean 
military service, or for whom the Minister of Justice decides reinstatement would be 
inappropriate for purposes of national security, sustainment of order, or public wel-
fare. Id., art. 9(2).
43. Id. art. 10.
44. Id. arts. 12(1), 14-2(1).
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they refused, they could lose their South Korean nationality.45 
The final group of North Korean nationals that would not be considered South 
Korean nationals are those individuals who can trace their Korean lineage only 
through maternal descent prior to June 14, 1998. On that date, a revised South 
Korea Nationality Act permitted South Korean nationality by maternal or paternal 
descent, as consistent with Article 9 of the 1984 Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, to which the South Korean 
government had recently withdrawn a reservation.46
In practice, this exception will most often cover individuals born before June 
14, 1998 to a North Korean mother and a foreign (generally Chinese) father. This 
is due to the fact that prior to June 14, 1998, the South Korean nationality law 
only recognized the passing of nationality by patriarchal jus sanguinis.47 This rule 
is subject to a potential exception: when identifying the identity of the father is 
deemed impossible, as is sometimes the case where the mother and father were 
not legally married, then South Korean nationality will be recognized.48 
In some (but not all) cases, individuals born of a North Korean national 
mother and a non-Korean father before 1998 will still be North Korean nationals, 
as the North Korean nationality law did not contain a similarly discriminatory 
45. Id. art. 14-2(4).
46.  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
Dec. 8, 1979,  1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
47.  The 1998 Nationality Act revisions changing the patriarchal nature of South Korean 
nationality came about in part due to pressure from a legal case involving a North 
Korean national. The appellant, Gim Gwangho, had a North Korean national father 
who had already taken Chinese citizenship at the time of the appellant’s birth, and 
was therefore not considered an South Korean national. The appellant’s mother was 
a North Korean national. When Gim received a deportation order, he filed suit, al-
leging that the patriarchalism of South Korean nationality law was unconstitutional. 
Before the questions could be heard by the Constitutional Court, the National As-
sembly revised the Nationality Act to allow for the passage of nationality by mater-
nal descent. See Chulwoo Lee, ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ in Korean Law: The Creation, Ac-
commodation, and Exclusion of Outsiders in Korea, in East Asian Law: Universal 
Norms and Local Cultures 105 (Lucie Cheng, Arthur Rosett, & Margaret Woo eds., 
2003)..The case was later heard by the South Korea Constitutional Court, as the pre-
viously mentioned Nationality Act Case. Nationality Act Case, supra note 10.
48.  E-mail from Kyu Geun Cha, Attorney, Jeon, Cha & Lee (Nov. 12, 2013, 21:05 KST) 
(on file with author). In fact, many marriages between North Korean women and 
Chinese men were not legally registered, due to the irregular status of the North Ko-
rean escapee.
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preference for paternal descent. Rather, Article 4 of the 1963 North Korean 
nationality law stated that children of one North Korean national parent and one 
non-North Korean national parent are North Korean citizens when both parents 
were residing in North Korea at the time of the birth, while Article 5 of the 1963 
North Korean nationality law stated that the nationality of a child of one North 
Korean national parent and one non-North Korean national parent residing abroad 
“shall be determined by the agreement of his parents.”49
Ⅳ. Effectiveness of South Korean Citizenship
Of course, South Korean citizenship can only be considered practically 
meaningful if it is effective, as well as being formally present. At the very least, 
effective citizenship must convey an entitlement – and a practical ability – to 
enter the country of one’s citizenship. This section will examine whether North 
Koreans, who as previously discussed are in all but very rare cases South Korean 
citizens, can be said to possess the entitlement and ability to enter South Korea, 
thus rendering effective their formal citizenship.50
North Korean escapees usually leave their country by crossing the border into 
China. Once in China (or once their visa expires, for those who come legally), 
the North Korean escapees are considered irregular economic migrants, and are 
under a constant threat of repatriation to North Korea, as well as exploitation 
by human traffickers and others in Northeast China.51 While in China, South 
Korean authorities are almost always unable (or unwilling) to help North Korean 
nationals reach South Korea. There are some isolated exceptions to this rule 
where the South Korean government has requested Chinese permission for the 
transfer of a North Korean escapee who has entered a South Korean diplomatic 
or consular compound. These requests have eventually been granted after a very 
long wait (between one and three years). Generally, however, South Korean 
authorities will reject assistance to North Korean escapees who approach them 
while in China.
49.  North Korea Nationality Law, supra note 39, arts. 4, 5.
50.  As a perhaps obvious starting point, it should be noted that North Koreans in North 
Korea are in practice unable to directly travel to South Korea or obtain South Ko-
rean resident registration cards or passports. This section will therefore focus on 
procedures and entitlements of North Koreans outside of North Korea.
51.  See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human 
Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, ¶¶ 435-77, A/HRC/25/63 (Feb. 
7, 2014).
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Thus, in order to reach South Korea, North Korean escapees have three 
choices with different legal consequences for receiving permission to enter South 
Korea. First, they can (directly or indirectly) approach a South Korean embassy 
or consulate outside of China and Russia, and request protection and settlement 
support. Second, they can request protection from Russian authorities. Third, they 
can travel independently to South Korea. Each of these options will be discussed 
in turn.
The vast majority of North Korean escapees choose the first option, 
undertaking an expensive and dangerous journey to (usually) Southeast Asia or 
Mongolia and either directly approaching a South Korean embassy or consular 
official to request protection or approaching local authorities in a country such 
as Thailand where officials have a good track record of delivering North Korean 
escapees to South Korean authorities (after a period of detention).52 This voyage 
is generally undertaken with the assistance of brokers, and the escapee risks 
repatriation to North Korea when caught in China. Even after the North Korean 
escapees cross over the border to Myanmar, Laos, or Vietnam, the risks of 
exploitation and repatriation exist. Most notoriously, in May 2013, nine young 
North Korean escapees were publicly repatriated from Laos to China, and from 
China to North Korea, an incident that was widely condemned in South Korea 
and elsewhere.53
Usually, however, North Korean escapees that successfully contact South 
Korean embassy or consular personnel and declare their wish to settle in South 
Korea are flown to South Korea, where they are allowed to settle down and live 
as ordinary citizens. First, however, applicants are subject to investigation under 
the Act on Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping from North 
Korea (‘Act on Protection and Settlement Support’) to see if they qualify for a 
flight to South Korea.54 This investigation is generally managed by the Ministry 
52.  The most popular destination point for North Korean escapees who want to obtain 
protection from the South Korean authorities is Thailand, where a reported 2,500 
North Korean escapees went in 2010. Korea Institute for National Unification, White 
Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 465 (2013).
53.  Jethro Mullen, Outcry over Young North Korean Refugees Handed Back to Regime 
by Laos, CNN (June 3, 2012), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/31/world/asia/laos-
north-korea-refugees/.
54.  Bukhan yitaljumin boho mit jungchak jiwoneh gwanhan beobyul [Act on the Pro-
tection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping from North Korea], Act No. 
5259, Jan. 13, 1997, amended by  Act No. 10188, Mar. 26, 2010 (S. Kor.) [hereinafter 
Act on Protection and Settlement Support]. 
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of Foreign Affairs but in special circumstances protection decisions are made in 
Seoul by the Consultative Council on Residents Escaping from North Korea55 or 
the Director of the National Intelligence Service (when national security is likely 
to be affected to a considerable extent).56 
The investigation currently takes roughly a month, during which period South 
Korean nationality remains basically ineffective; the escapees are not given any 
temporary South Korean identification card or other proof of nationality. At 
times, the delay in reaching South Korea after North Korean escapees request 
protection can be much longer than a month, however, depending on political 
considerations in the host country. There have been frequent complaints from 
civil society organizations that the procedures for investigating and ensuring the 
safety of North Korean escapees vary considerably in the different embassies, 
and that in some cases the South Korean embassy personnel have failed to 
sufficiently protect North Korean escapees. In reaction to the Laos repatriation 
incident, however, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a 
new division in September 2013 to coordinate policy on North Korean escapee 
issues, and distributed a revised manual on North Korean escapee protocol to the 
various embassies and consulates.57
There is some ambiguity as to the legal and practical requirements 
to qualify for resettlement in South Korea. The Act on Protection and 
Settlement Support never explicitly states that permission to legally enter 
South Korea (and free transportation to South Korea) is an element of 
protection, but many commentators have concluded that this is the case.58 
55.  The Consultative Council on Residents Escaping from North Korea is made up of 
representatives of the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Unification, Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, National Intelligence Service, and National Police Agency. It is chaired 
by the Vice Minister for Unification.
56. Act on Protection and Settlement Support, supra note 54, art. 8(1).
57.  Interview with Jimin Kim, Director, Nat’l Cmty. External Cooperation Team, South 
Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Seoul (Oct. 29, 2013).
58.  Chulwoo Lee, supra note 20, at 232 (protection is “a series of measures ranging 
from admission into a diplomatic mission and into South Korea to various forms of 
socio-economic support provided in South Korea.”); Refugee Review Tribunal Case 
No.1000331 [2010] RRTA 932, para. 56 (Austl.) (citing a report from Pil Kyu Hwang 
stating that the only legal avenue for a North Korean escapee to enter South Korea 
is by applying for ‘protection’); KK and ors (Nationality: North Korea), supra note 
7, para. 35 (citing a report by Christoph Bluth stating that "[t]he Act on Protection is 
interpreted as giving the government the right to decide who can be admitted to the 
country”).
  21KLRI Journal of Law and Legislation    VOLUME 4  NUMBER 2, 2014
However, other South Korean government authorities and commentators have 
stated that all or almost all South Korean nationals will be sent to South Korea.59 
As a matter of law, transportation to South Korea should be interpreted as a form 
of protection, and North Korean escapees who fit within the criteria of the Act 
on Protection and Settlement Support are entitled to receive this benefit. There is 
no prohibition on resettling North Korean escapees who fall outside the terms of 
the Act, though, and in practice NGO and government sources agree that at least 
in recent years, North Korean nationals who do not fall within the terms of the 
Act on Protection and Settlement Support have normally been resettled in South 
Korea, at least when not doing so would put them at risk of repatriation to North 
Korea.60 However, those resettled individuals that do not fit within the criteria of 
the Act on Protection and Settlement Support do not receive any of the various 
forms of settlement support upon arrival.61 The following paragraphs will outline 
59.  Jae-Chun Won, supra note 15, at 158 (“as long as they successfully enter the com-
pound of the foreign mission of South Korea, almost all are brought to South Ko-
rea.”) Jeong-Hwan Kim at the Ministry of Justice stated that all North Korean escap-
ees who are South Korean nationals would be resettled in South Korea. Interview 
with Jeong-Hwan Kim, Public Prosecutor, South Korea Ministry of Justice, Unifica-
tion Legal Affairs Div., in Gwacheon (Nov. 18, 2013).
60.  In interviews with NGO representatives and government officials, I was consistently 
informed that genuine North Korean escapees outside of China are not in 
practice refused transit to South Korea. E-mail from Kay Seok, Korea Country 
Representative, Nat’l Democratic Inst (Nov. 25, 2013, 20:27 KST) (on file with 
author); See also Interview with Jeong-Hwan Kim, supra note 59.
61.  Pursuant to the Act on Protection and Settlement Support, resettling North Koreans 
receive both financial support and access to targeted services. While the amount of 
support varies by household size, as of 2012, a single-person household received 3 
million won upon leaving Hanawon and an additional 3 million won in quarterly 
installments. Additional monetary support is given to vulnerable groups such as 
seniors, the mentally or physically challenged, people in need of long-term medical 
treatment, and children of single-parent families, and financial incentives are also 
available for those who undergo vocational training, obtain certificates of qualifica-
tion, or continue to work at the same job for more than six months. North Korean 
settlers are also provided with housing in an area of their choice, subject to avail-
ability in different regions. As a means of promoting the employment of DPRK set-
tlers, employers receive subsidies of 50% of a DPRK settler’s salary (below a certain 
limit). Young DPRK settlers can also enjoy tuition exemptions at public universities 
and fifty percent tuition discounts at private universities. In addition, DPRK settlers 
can access a range of services from regional adaptation centers, including voca-
tional training, counselling, health services, and living assistance. Korea inStitute 
for national unifiCation, WHite PaPer on Human rigHtS in nortH Korea 179-95 
(2013).
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the legal requirements for protection under the Act on Protection and Settlement 
Support, while also noting current discretionary resettlement practice.
Article 2(1) of the Act on Protection and Settlement Support specifies that in 
order to receive protection and support, applicants must qualify as “residents 
escaping from North Korea,” which means “persons who have their residence, 
lineal ascendants and descendants, spouses, workplaces, etc. in the area north of 
the Military Demarcation Line (hereinafter referred to as ‘North Korea’) and who 
have not acquired any foreign nationality after escaping from North Korea.”62 
This clause is interpreted liberally by the South Korean authorities regarding 
locations of ascendants, descendants, spouses and workplaces; even those who 
work outside of North Korea (i.e., diplomats or migrant laborers) or have family 
elsewhere (i.e., already in South Korea) are regularly granted protection and 
settlement support. 
On the other hand, individuals who have voluntarily acquired a second 
nationality after escaping and individuals that are not of Korean ethnicity will 
generally be denied all forms of protection (and as mentioned, would not be 
considered South Korean nationals). The children of North Korean escapees who 
have one Korean parent and one Chinese parent normally have involuntarily 
acquired de jure Chinese citizenship, even though many of them were not 
registered by their parents, meaning they cannot exercise their rights as a Chinese 
citizen. These individuals are not covered by the terms of the Act on Protection 
and Settlement Support, but they are customarily resettled in South Korea as long 
as they are under the age of 19, with decisions on older dual nationals made on 
a case by case basis. However, these individuals will not be eligible to receive 
settlement benefits upon arrival.63 The ineligibility of children of North Korean 
women and Chinese men for settlement benefits has been a politically sensitive 
issue in recent years. 
Regarding place of residence, this clause is not used to exclude North Korean 
escapees who have been residing temporarily in a third country for work or other 
reasons, but (along with Article 9(4)) is used to deny South Korean resettlement 
to members of the Chogyo group, who emigrated from North Korea to China in 
62.  Act on Protection and Settlement Support, supra note 54, art. 2(1).
63.  See Seoul Administrative Court [Admin. Ct.], 2008GuHap211, Oct. 24 2008 (S. 
Kor.) (stating that the applicant would have been denied settlement support if his 
father was Chinese, as the South Korean authorities claimed, but that in fact his 
mother was married to a North Korean national while she was residing in China, so 
paternity should be assigned to the mother’s legal husband and the applicant there-
fore qualifies for settlement support).
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the 1950s and 1960s, and their descendants, who live in China legally (usually as 
permanent residents).64 In some cases it can be quite difficult for South Korean 
authorities to differentiate between Chogyo (who are South Korean nationals but 
are denied protection), Chosonjok (ethnic Koreans who migrated to China prior 
to 1945 and are Chinese nationals but not South Korean nationals), Hwagyo 
(Chinese nationals who have lived in North Korea for generations but are not 
South Korean nationals) and more recent ethnically Korean North Korean 
escapees (many of whom have lived for several years in China prior to applying 
for protection).
Second, the Act on Protection and Settlement Support contains six exclusion 
clauses in Article 9, which states, in part:  
(1)  In determining whether to provide protection pursuant to the 
main sentence of Article 8(1), any of the following persons 
may not be designated as persons eligible for protection:
    1.  International criminal offenders involved in aircraft 
hijacking, drug trafficking, terrorism or genocide, etc.;
    2.  Offenders of nonpolitical, serious crimes such as murder, 
etc.;
    3. Suspects of disguised escape;
    4.  Persons who have earned their living for not less than ten 
years in their respective countries of sojourn;
    5.  Persons who have applied for protection when one year 
elapsed since their entry into the Republic of Korea;
    6.  Other persons prescribed by Presidential Decree as unfit for 
the designation as persons eligible for protection.65
Thus, under Articles 9(1)(1) and 9(1)(2), North Korean escapees with criminal 
backgrounds deemed sufficiently serious by the South Korean authorities do not 
qualify for protection under the Act on Protection and Settlement Support. This 
category includes crimes of violence such as murder and sexual assault, as well 
as drug crimes and human trafficking. According to MOU and MOJ, however, 
these individuals are in fact resettled in South Korea. However, individuals with 
serious criminal records do not receive settlement support; as of October 2013, 
64.  Estimates of the size of this group range from 5,000 to 10,000 individuals. See An-
drei Lankov, Smuggler’s Paradise, Korea timeS (Oct. 14, 2007, 20:28 PM), https://
www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2014/04/165_11883.html.
65. Act on Protection and Settlement Support, supra note 54, art. 9(1).
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sixteen individuals have been denied support for this reason (most commonly due 
to their involvement in drug crimes).66  
Article 9(1)(3) excludes individuals who are “suspects of disguised escape.” 
This somewhat awkward formulation refers to those who are suspected of being 
North Korean spies or agents. Again, however, such suspicion does not result in 
a refusal to resettle. According to MOJ, even individuals strongly suspected of 
being spies are still transported to South Korea, as long as they are genuine North 
Korean nationals.67 Upon arrival in Seoul, they are subject to further investigation 
by MOJ and the National Intelligence Service, and to criminal punishment if 
found guilty of espionage or related crimes. 
The Article 9(1)(4) exclusion clause denies protection and settlement support to 
North Korean escapees who have lived outside of North Korea for more than ten 
years. This provision, which originally lacked explicit exceptions, in fact covers a 
large number of applicants, as it is relatively common for North Korean escapees 
to settle for long periods of time in Northeast China before eventually deciding 
to continue on to South Korea. After criticism of its overbroad scope, however, 
this exclusion provision was narrowed by the Presidential Decree accompanying 
the most recent revisions, which state in Article 16 that a stay of over ten years in 
a foreign country does not prevent a person from being eligible for protection in 
unavoidable circumstances, such as where the applicant was seized or detained 
against his or her will, was subjected to an extended stay in a detention center, 
or was not able to have an ordinary or stable life in the countries of flight or 
sojourn.68 In practice, this clause is interpreted relatively liberally, especially as 
regards South Korean resettlement. If an individual genuinely escaped North 
Korea and lacks secure legal status in China, then the South Korean government 
will very likely determine that they were in some way forcibly prevented from 
seeking South Korean assistance, whether by lack of sufficient money to transit 
to a third country, or due to the actions of Chinese authorities, an employer, or a 
family member. However, members of the Chogyo group, who have lived legally 
in China for over ten years, will generally not be resettled in South Korea or 
given settlement support.
The Article 9(1)(5) exclusion, which regulates the maximum time period for 
66.  E-mail from Hae Kyung Kim, South Korea Ministry of Unification (Nov. 12, 2013, 
17:08 KST) (on file with author); Interview with Jimin Kim, supra note 57.
67. Interview with Jeong-Hwan Kim, supra note 59.
68.  Geunro gijunbeob sihaengryung [Enforcement Decree of the Labor Standards Act], 
Presidential Decree No. 23488, Mar. 27, 1997, as amended (S. Kor.).
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application for benefits upon arrival in South Korea, is not relevant outside of 
South Korea (it should be recalled that the Act on Protection and Settlement 
Support is also used to determine eligibility for benefits for North Korean 
escapees who manage to come to South Korea on their own). 
The Article 9(1)(6) exclusion has been elaborated upon in Article 16(1) of the 
Presidential Decree to provide for the exclusion of persons who (1) are likely to 
cause South Korea great political and diplomatic difficulty; (2) committed violent 
acts harming other people’s personal safety or damaged resettlement support 
facilities or (3) obtained legitimate residence status in third countries after having 
departed North Korea.69 Jimin Kim, who is the director of the office dealing with 
North Korean escapees at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has 
stated that he is not aware of this clause ever being used to deny protection to a 
North Korean escapee.70 It is certainly possible, however, that Article 16(1)(3) 
would be used to decline travel assistance and settlement support to an individual 
who received formal refugee status in a third country. 
Finally, it is worth noting that Article 3 of the Act on Protection and Settlement 
Support states that the Act “shall apply to residents escaping from North Korea 
who have expressed their intention to be protected by the Republic of Korea.”71 
Similarly, Article 7 outlines the protection process for North Korean escapees who 
“desire to be protected under this Act.”72 There is a lack of clarity as to whether 
this ‘will and desire’ factor is taken into account when determining eligibility 
to enter South Korea. When asked, Jimin Kim from the South Korean Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs stated that ‘will and desire’ was never a relevant factor in his 
investigations.73 Hae Kyung Kim from the Ministry of Unification has also stated 
that a North Korean escapee who had previously filed an unsuccessful asylum 
claim elsewhere would be assessed under the same procedures as any other North 
Korean escapee.74
To sum up, according to the best available evidence, current practice in 
determining eligibility for resettlement is as follows. If a North Korean escapee 
qualifies for protection under the Act on Protection and Settlement Support, 
then she will be resettled in South Korea when she approaches a South Korean 
69. Id.
70. Interview with Jimin Kim, supra note 57.
71. Act on Protection and Settlement Support, supra note 54, art. 3.
72. Id. art. 7.
73. Interview with Jimin Kim, supra note 57.
74. E-mail from Hae Kyung Kim, supra note 66. 
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embassy or consulate outside of China. Where a North Korean escapee does not 
qualify for protection under the Act on Protection and Settlement Support, then 
the South Korean authorities will resettle her in South Korea anyhow, provided 
she is a South Korean national, if there is any chance that not doing so would 
lead to her being repatriated to North Korea. In practice, this means that Chogyo 
who have a stable legal status in China will normally be turned away, as they 
can return to China without risk of being repatriated to North Korea. In addition, 
North Korean escapees who ask South Korean authorities for resettlement in 
a developed country with a strong refugee protection system may get (at least 
preliminarily) rejected if they do not qualify for protection under the Act on 
Protection and Settlement Support, because the South Korean authorities are 
confident that the developed country will not repatriate them to North Korea (or 
China). There are anecdotal examples of such refusals in the United Kingdom,75 
and there have been statements implying a refusal to resettle those who fail 
to qualify under the Act on Protection and Settlement Support from the South 
Korean embassy in Canada.76 However, it is likely that in these circumstances, the 
South Korean government would eventually resettle any genuine North Korean 
escapee who is a South Korean national if that person is refused asylum or if the 
host country makes a request through diplomatic channels.
Although most North Korean escapees follow the aforementioned route to 
Southeast Asia or Mongolia, a small number instead travel to Russia (or, more 
commonly, escape from timber camps and construction sites within Russia 
where they are sent by the North Korean government as migrant workers), 
and declare their intention of seeking refugee status to the Russian authorities. 
Russian authorities will in theory then refer their cases to the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) to process their refugee status 
determination.77 When referred to UNHCR and found by UNHCR to be refugees, 
the North Korean escapees will have the choice of receiving asylum in Russia, 
South Korea, or a third country (the United States is willing to resettle North 
Korean escapees, as is Japan for North Korean escapees that previously lived in 
75.  KK and ors (Nationality: North Korea), supra note 7, paras. 44-48 (citing reports 
from four U.K. lawyers regarding the South Korean embassy’s refusal to resettle 
North Korean escapees).
76. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, supra note 29.
77.  In practice, local authorities in Siberia would be extremely unlikely to follow this 
procedure, and there are many cases of North Korean escapees living irregularly on 
the margins of Russian society as well as North Korean asylum seekers being repa-
triated to North Korea.
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Japan). 
Once North Korean escapees are flown to South Korea (whether from Russia 
or elsewhere in the world), their South Korean nationality can be said to become 
effective. Thus, while they are subject to continued investigation upon their 
arrival, they are at this point recognized as South Korean nationals and are not 
at risk of deportation if it is later found that they fall within one of the exclusion 
clauses of Article 9 of the Act on Protection and Settlement Support. When such 
discoveries are made, the North Korean escapees will, however, lose their access 
to social and monetary support. If they are found to be North Korean agents or 
spies, they will be subject to imprisonment pursuant to South Korean criminal 
law, after which they will be given the choice of staying in South Korea or 
returning to North Korea.78 Deportation (to China) would be a possibility only 
where investigation later reveals that the individual was a Chinese national but 
not a North Korean (or South Korean) national.
Finally, it is worth noting that a very small number of North Korean nationals 
come to South Korea each year without the assistance of the South Korean 
embassy or consular personnel. This is usually done either by boat (from China) 
or by airplane. If a North Korean national arrives at a South Korean airport 
or seaport and credibly declares his or her identity, she will be allowed entry. 
However, it would be very hard (if not impossible) for a North Korean escapee 
to legally board a South Korea-bound airplane or ferry because she will not 
possess a passport or other appropriate documentation. South Korean entrance 
visas are also necessary for those entering with Chinese passports, unless they 
travel to Jeju Island, which is a visa-free zone for Chinese nationals. There have, 
however, been some cases of North Korean nationals flying to South Korea with 
fraudulent Chinese passports. Direct land crossing from North Korea to South 
Korea is virtually impossible because of the heavily fortified nature of the North-
South border, and while direct sea crossings from North Korea to South Korea 
occasionally occur (whether by accident or on purpose) they are also very rare. 
Some (but not all) of the North Korean nationals that arrive independently 
in South Korea are eligible to apply for settlement support under the Act on 
Protection and Settlement Support. If these individuals are successful, they 
receive the same level of material support as those who were assisted in coming 
over to South Korea. These individuals will receive their resident registration 
number showing proof of South Korean citizenship upon successful application 
for settlement support.
78. Interview with Jeong-Hwan Kim, supra note 59.
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Many of those that arrive in South Korea independently do not qualify for 
settlement support however, because they fall into one of the exceptions in Article 
9 of the Act on Protection and Settlement Support (such as, most commonly, 
having lived in China for over ten years). These individuals are able to petition 
to have their citizenship affirmed by the Ministry of Justice through nationality 
adjudication under Article 20 of the Nationality Act.79 While Article 20 nationality 
adjudication is available for anyone that wants to have their Korean nationality 
affirmed, in practice most applicants are North Korean escapees.80 Nationality 
adjudication is only available for individuals who are physically present in South 
Korea (unlike protection under the Act on Protection and Settlement Support). 
The Article 20 process leads either to a finding that an individual is a South 
Korean citizen or a finding that she has an ‘undeterminable’ nationality. While 
the success rate for applicants is high, a finding of ‘undeterminable’ nationality 
may result in an individual becoming de facto stateless.81 It should be emphasized 
that the Article 20 procedure will not examine extraneous issues such as criminal 
history, time spent outside of North Korea, or possible North Korean allegiance. 
 
Ⅴ. Conclusion
Despite occasional confusion among the world’s courts and contestation 
within Korea, the formal South Korean citizenship status of North Koreans 
is quite clear. North Koreans are, from birth, South Korean citizens, with the 
exception of three rare categories: naturalized North Korean nationals of a non-
Korean ethnicity, North Korean nationals who have voluntarily taken on the 
citizenship of a third country, and North Korean nationals who can trace their 
Korean lineage only through maternal descent prior to June 14, 1998.
The practical effectiveness of that citizenship is less clear. North Koreans 
will be allowed to enter South Korea when they present themselves at a Korean 
airport or seaport, and will be able to assert their citizenship through an Article 20 
petition. In reality, however, such arrivals are rare, given South Korea’s physical 
situation and the strict prohibition on international transit without a visa in the 
destination country that is enforced by airlines and ferry companies. Most North 
79.  South Korea Nationality Act, supra note 14, art. 20(1) (“Where it is unclear whether 
a person has attained or is holding the nationality of the Republic of Korea, the Min-
ister of Justice may determine such fact upon review”).
80. See In Seop Chung, supra note 12, at 24.
81. Id. at 25.
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Korean escapees instead request South Korean diplomatic or consular authorities 
to give them the appropriate documentation allowing them to legally travel to 
South Korea. As discussed in this article, the best evidence is that an entrance 
permit (and an airplane ticket) is generally given to North Korean escapees 
outside of China, with the exception of Chogyo, and a possible exception in 
developed countries where repatriation to North Korea is not a real risk.82 
Supplying such documentation is not a legal requirement, however. While the 
Act on Protection and Settlement Support is vague on the issue, it is perhaps best 
interpreted as requiring South Korean officials to assist in resettlement to South 
Korea. However, the Act excludes several categories, such as North Koreans who 
have spent over ten years in a third country, and North Koreans with a serious 
criminal record. It would be preferable if the Act were amended to clarify that all 
North Korean escapees are entitled to receive a permit to enter South Korea, from 
where they could later apply for official documentation of their South Korean 
citizenship.  This entitlement could be made independent of the entitlement to 
settlement support (which could still exclude those with a serious criminal record, 
etc.) and could also be made independent of the entitlement to free transport 
to South Korea as facilitated by South Korean embassy or consular personnel, 
which could be restricted to North Korean escapees outside of China. These 
clarifications would make the Act on Protection and Settlement Support more 
consistent with international law (specifically Article 12(4) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides for the right to enter one’s 
own country), without leading to major changes  in the current state of Korean 
government practice. While direct access to South Korea from China would still 
no doubt be blocked, it would be clear that the roadblock was due to the Chinese 
authorities’ unwillingness to allow North Koreans to board international flights 
or ferries, and not the reluctance of the South Korean authorities to give them 
entrance permits. This type of statutory clarification would also assist North 
Korean escapees (and their advocates) in becoming more aware of their rights 
and status under South Korean law, and would allow foreign observers to develop 
more appropriate refugee policies for North Korean asylum seekers that maintain 
compliance with the Refugee Convention. North Korean asylum seekers that 
maintain compliance with the Refugee Convention.
82.  It should be noted that North Korean settlers are not eligible to receive a South Ko-
rean registration number allowing full recognition as a South Korean citizen until 
the time of their departure from the Hanawon resettlement facility. KoRea iNstitute 
foR NatioNaL uNifiCatioN, supra note 61, at 179.  
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